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ABSTRACT
Since the technology of mobile cloud computing has brought a lot of benefits to information world, many applications in
mobile devices based on cloud have emerged and boomed in the last years. According to the storage limitation, data owners
would like to upload and further share the data through the cloud. Due to the safety requirements, mobile data owners are
requested to provide credentials such as authentication tags along with the data. However, it is impossible to require mobile
data owners to provide every authenticated computational results. The solution that signers’ privilege is outsourced to the
cloud would be a promising way. To solve this problem, we propose three secure multi-entities delegated authentication
protocols (MEDAPs) in mobile cloud computing, which enables the multiple mobile data owners to authorize a group
designated cloud servers with the signing rights. The security of MEDAPs is constructed on three cryptographic primitive
identity-based multi-proxy signature (IBMPS), identity-based proxy multi-signature (IBPMS), and identity-based multi-
proxy multi-signature (IBMPMS), relied on the cubic residues, equaling to the integer factorization assumption. We also
give the formal security proof under adaptively chosen message attacks and chosen identity/warrant attacks. Furthermore,
compared with the pairing based protocol, MEDAPs are quite efficient and the communication overhead is nearly not a
linear growth with the number of cloud servers. Copyright c 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the emerging of cloud computing, cloud-based applications have been booming in recent years[1]. Many applications
based on the outsourced computation have attracted the researchers and engineers from academy and industry on account of
the cloud’s powerful storage and computational capability. Most of the cloud users are using the mobile devices connecting
the cloud through wireless (sometimes wired) networks [2, 3]. In contrast with the traditional computation, the cloud users
have lost the physical control on their data in cloud computing [4, 5].
As it known, cloud servers are controlled by the cloud service providers in logically but distributed in physics all over
the world through the networks [6]. Sometimes, the servers in the cloud might be compromised by hackers to provider
unauthentic data and computational results to cloud users. Thus, these kinds of outsourced computation performed on
the untrusted cloud servers have restricted the mobile cloud computing to some extent. In some scenarios, the mobile data
owners upload their records to the cloud for further sharing among data consumers. Taking the mobile sensors for example,
the sensors in the oceans report the temperature, salinity, and pH values in the monitor area and upload to the cloud for
further analysis and data sharing. In order to keep the data authentication and integrity, the data owners are encouraged to
upload credentials such as authentication tags together with the corresponding data as an evidence to show the validation
of the data in the cloud servers. To achieve this target, some related work has tried to build such authentication tags [7, 8].
Moreover, the data consumers are expected to fetch the authenticated data, but also would like to compute and aggregate
on these authenticated data [9] relying on the cloud servers’ capability.
However, in our cases, the mobile data owners can not achieve onlined connecting to the cloud [10] since they can not
afford such an excessive battery consuming in data transmission. In addition, the mobile data owners can not afford too
much data computational burden from different computation requests in demand.
There are straightforward solutions that seem to come over the above obstacles. One of the solutions is if the mobile
data consumers is allowed to fetch the original data only, the mobile data owners store the whole the authenticated tags
in advance. However, it is impossible for the mobile data owners due to the various computation requests from cloud
consumers. In most cases, the authenticated data need to be calculated or transformed by the various requests. It is another
solution that the computation requests need to be forwarded to the responsible mobile data owners, which results in
considerable computational overhead and communication overhead due to the offline of the mobile data owners. In order
to reduce the computational cost and communication delay, it is a simple improvement that the mobile data owners directly
distribute the secret keys to cloud servers. Thus, the authentication service has been achieved on behalf of the mobile data
owners since the cloud servers independently finish the data authentication. However, it also brings severe security risks
that the remote cloud servers might have been broken down by the adversaries, which leads to the keys leaked out.
Digital signature are always providing the properties of authenticity and non-repudiation in the communications [11].
Ordinary signature may be unavailable due to the existential unforgery property. Homomorphic signature [12] might be
a feasible solution which achieves either additional operations or multiply operations. A number of operations such as
data comparison, non-linear calculation and SQL query [13] are beyond the homomorphic signature though it often brings
considerable computational cost [12]. As a result, the technique that allows the data owners conditionally outsource their
authenticated privilege to the cloud would be a promising way [14].
To address the above problems, we build three secure multi-entities delegated authentication protocols (MEDAPs)
for mobile cloud computing. According to the novel IBMPS scheme and IBMPMS scheme, the mobile data owners could
authorize the authenticated rights to several specified cloud servers which would achieve the authenticated tags’ generation
in a collaborating way on behalf of the mobile data owners. In addition, our MEDAPs allow the mobile data owners to
conditionally authorize to the cloud servers. Moreover, the MEDAPs are quite efficient compared with other bilinear
pairing based protocols.
Our work is a significant effort towards delegated authentication considering multiple mobile data owners and multiple
cloud servers to offer authentication service in a mobile cloud model. The contributions can be mainly summarized in
following four aspects.
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Figure 1. A multi-cloud servers delegated authentication in mobile cloud computing
 Firstly, we propose an IBMPS scheme in cryptography based on cubic residues that can be proved secure under the
integer factorization assumption in the random oracle model.
 Secondly, we propose an efficient and multi-entities secure delegated authentication protocol (MEDAP-I), as
a significant application of our IBMPS scheme, to offer authenticated data and computational results to data
consumers by the designated cloud servers on behalf of the data owners.
 Thirdly, considering various situations and preventing the single point of failure, we propose two multi-entities
delegated authentication protocols (MEDAP-II andMEDAP-III) among multiple mobile data owners and multiple
cloud servers, based on our IBMPMS scheme.
 Finally, MEDAPs support a conditional delegated authentication that is according to the security model, any
compromised cloud servers and mobile data owners could lead to authentication services ceased.
The organization of the rest paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our problem formalized. Section 3 and Section
4 give the necessary mathematic preliminaries and formal definition of IBMPS scheme in cryptograhy, respectively. In
Section 5, we propose a conctete IBMPS construction in cryptogaphy proven secure in Section 6. Section 7 gives the
detailed application of IBMPS scheme in a delegated authentication protocols. Section 8 also extends our IBMPS and
designs a novel delegated authentication protocols supporting multiple data owners. Section 9 lists some related work.
Section 10 concludes the paper at the end of this paper.
2. SYSTEM FORMULATION
We present the system architectures, security problems, and design goals.
2.1. System Architectures
we have considered a mobile cloud computing model which is illustrated in Figure 1. In this model, it is constituted of four
entities: system authority, cloud servers, mobile data owners and mobile data consumers.
 System Authority (SA). SA administrates the whole system, which is independent with other entities in system.
SA is in charge of the system setup and key distribution to the participants. It is assumed that SA controlled by the
government can not be broken down by any adversaries.
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 Cloud Servers. The core of the cloud consists of a group of servers, denoted as S1;S2; :::;Sn, with computation
and storage resources, as a general cloud computing model. These cloud servers process huge of computation and
storage capability compared with the data owners and data consumers.
 Mobile Data Owners. It is assumed that the data owners work in a mobile way in our model. The mobile data
owners may be the mobile sensors and upload to the cloud when the mobile data owners eventually encounter to
the networks. As a result, the mobile data owners can not be always available. From the security consideration, the
mobile data owners can add authenticated tags with the data achieved by digital signature.
 Data Consumers. In our model, the data consumers always request the data and computation due to their lower
computation and smaller storage capability when they demand. From the security aspect, the data consumers want
to fetch the authenticated data and computing results to keep the authenticity, which is hard to achieve when the
data owner is unavailable.
2.2. Threat Models
In this work, it is assumed that the adversary can get all the identities in the system. We also consider an extreme situation
that the attackers control the most participants and work against only one honest signer. In addition, we assume that there
exist no secure channels between the mobile data owners and cloud servers. According to the different ability of the
attacker, the threat model can be classified into two catalogues.
 The adversary could compromise both of the mobile data owner and at most n  1 cloud servers. As a result, the
attacker has obtained the secret keys of the mobile data owner and n  1 cloud servers except one cloud server. The
adversary aims to make a valid multi-signature and provide data authentication services for cloud users without the
participation of the honest cloud servers.
 The adversary could compromise all of the n cloud servers. In this case, the adversary knows the secret keys of n
cloud servers except the data owner. The adversary aims to make a valid delegation from the data owner and further
make a valid multi-signature to provide data authentication services for cloud users without the delegation of the
data owner.
2.3. Design Goals
The protocols are to achieve the following goals.
 Data authentication. The cloud consumers could obtain the authenticated data from the cloud as well as the
computational results.
 Delegated authentication. The mobile data owners could conditionally authorize the cloud servers without directly
leaking the signing keys.
 Multiple entities. The data owners and cloud servers could be distributed corresponding to different situations and
preventing single point of failure.
 Efficiency. The computational overhead is lower than other bilinear pairing based protocols and the communication
overhead does not linear grow with the number of cloud servers.
3. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
3.1. Cubic Residue
Firstly, we give an introduction of cubic residue [15].
Definition 1 (cubic residue)
For an integer N > 0, a 2 ZN is a cubic residue modulo N if there exists some integer x 2 ZN which satisfies x3  a
(mod N). x is named as a cubic root of a modulo N .
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After that, we introduce the following lemma [15, 16] about cubic residue.
Lemma 1 (cubic residue construction)
If p is a prime with p  2 mod 3 and q is also a prime with q  4 or 7 (mod 9), we can produce a cubic residue modulo
N . Let a be a non-cubic modulo q, for any h 2 ZN we can compute that
 =
(q   1) (mod 9)
3
;  =  (mod 2) + 1;  = (q   1)=3;   a (mod q);   h (mod q)
and
b =
8><>:
0; if  = 1
1; if  = 
2; if  = 2
we can construct a cubic residue modulo N that is C = ab  h (mod N).
Theorem 1
Let p, q, N , C, and  be defined in Lemma 1, we can get a cubic root of C 1 by s  C [2 1(p 1)(q 1) 3]=9 (mod N):
Note that s3  C  1 (mod N).
3.2. Integer Factorization Assumption
let N = pq, where p; q are large primes. The integer factorization problem is easier if we can seek out two different cubic
roots s1; s2 of cubic residue a modulo N , where s31  s32  a (mod N) and s1 6= s2 (mod N). Thus, we can factor
N by executing Algorithm Fac(a; s1; s2) in polynomial time [17].
Algorithm 1 (Fac(a; s1; s2))
If s1 6= s2 (mod N), gcd(s1 + s2; N) or gcd(s1   s2; N) as non-trivial divisor of N , where gcd(; ) is an algorithm
to find out greatest common divisor.
4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEFINITIONS
4.1. Definition of IBMPS scheme
Let O be the original signer (the data owner in the mobile cloud model) and P1;P2; :::;Pn be a group of proxy signers
(the cloud servers in the mobile cloud model) designated by O. In addition, we denote that the identity of O and Pi are as
IDO and IDPi , respectively.
Definition 2 (Framework)
An identity-based multi-proxy signature scheme is defined as a following seven tuple IBMPS=(Setup, Extra, Sign, Verify,
MPGen, MPSign, MPVerify) [18].
 Setup(1k): The PKG runs this algorithm by taking a security parameter k as input, and outputs the whole system
sharing public parameters pp and master secret keys msk which PKG keeps in secret.
 Extra(ID;msk; pp): The algorithm is run by PKG on input a participant’s identity denoted as ID, master secret
keys msk PKG holds, and public parameters pp and generates the corresponding private key dID . Thus, PKG
uses this algorithm to generate secret keys for all participators in the system and distributes through some secure
channels.
 Sign(ID; dID;m; pp): This algorithm takes the signers identity ID and its secret key dID , the data to be signedm
and pp as input, outputs a signature tag  on the datam.
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 Verify(ID;m; ; pp): This algorithm is run by any verifiers by taking the signers identity ID, the data m, a
candidate signature tag  and pp as input. If  is a valid signature tag, this algorithm outputs 1. Otherwise, it
outputs 0.
 MPGen(IDO , IDP1 , IDP2 , ..., IDPn , dO , dP1 , dP2 , ..., dPn , !, pp): This is an interactive process among the
original signer and the designated proxy signers. All of the participants take as input their identities IDO , IDP1 ,
IDP2 , ..., IDPn and their secret keys dP1 , dP2 , ... , dPn and the delegation warrant !. As a result, each proxy
signer gets a partial proxy signing key skPi which is used to cooperatively produce IBMPS by the proxy signers
instead of the original signers.
 MPSign(skPi , !, m, pp): Each proxy signer takes its proxy signing key skPi , the delegation warrant !, and the
datam as input. The algorithm outputs an IBMPS p on behalf of O.
 MPVerify(IDO , IDP1 ; IDP2 ; :::; IDPn , !, m, p, pp): This algorithm takes the every participant’s identity
IDO; IDP1 ; IDP2 ; :::; IDPn , the delegation warrant !, the data m and a candidate multi-proxy signature tag
p. Finally, if p is indeed a valid IBMPS, it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
4.2. Security Model in Cryptography
We assume that the attacker A has known all the identities of original signer and proxy signers. A plays the role of the
original signer or one or more of the proxy signers and requests to other honest participants. A can be divided into two
catalogues:
 A1. The adversary has compromised the original signer O and n  1 proxy signers and obtained their secret keys.
In the case, A1 can output a valid delegation from O to the proxy signers. The object of A1 is to forge a valid
multi-proxy signature under the valid delegation by n proxy signers.
 A2. The adversary has compromised n proxy signers and obtained their secret keys except the original signerO. In
the case, A2 can output a valid multi-signature by n proxy signers. The object of A2 is to forge a valid delegation
from O.
Definition 3
Consider the games between Ai (i = 1 or 2) and the challenger C:
Step 1 C runs Setup and gets the public parameters pp and the master secret keymsk. The attacker A is sent pp while C
keepsmsk.
Step 2 C controls five oracles: a hash oracleOhash, a key extract oracleOext, a standard signing oracleOsign, a delegation
oracle Odel, and a multi-proxy signature oracle Omps which are used to provide a real distinguished environment
for the adversary.
Step 3 Ai adaptively queries to C as follows.
 Extra queries.WhenAi asks for the secret key of signer’s identity ID, C returns the secret key dID toA by
running algorithm Extra and then puts the tuple (ID; c; dID) into a list listE .
 Sign queries.WhenA can query the signature under the identity ID on datam, C visits the standard signing
oracle Osign and returns a standard signature  form. Then tuple (ID; ;m) is added to a list listS .
 Delegation queries. When A requests a delegation on proxy signer IDi under warrant !, C returns the
delegation  and puts the tuple (IDi; !; ) into a list listW .
 MPSign queries. When A requests multi-proxy signature on m under the warrant !, C outputs a partial
proxy signature p on datam. The tuple (!;m; p) is added to a list listM .
Step 4 Eventually, A outputs a forgery by winning the above games if one of the events satisfies.
1. A1’s goal is to make the forgeries.
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 A correct standard signature (m; ) by an honest signer IDn on a datam was not queried to Osign
but V erify(IDn;m; ) = 1.
 A correct multi-proxy signature (!;m; p) on a data m under the warrant ! by an honest signer
IDn on behalf of the original signer such that the original signer never authorize the only honest signer
that is (IDi ; !
) =2 listW and (!;m) =2 listM .
2. A2’s goal is to make the forgeries:
 A correct standard signature (m; ) by the honest signer IDn on a datam was not queried toOsign
and V erify(IDn;m; ) = 1.
 A correct multi-proxy signature (!;m; p) on a data m under the warrant ! where (!;m) =2
listM , by any proxy signer IDi which was never authorized by the original signers that is (IDi ; !
) =2
listW .
We denote that the advantage of adversary Ai, AdvAiIBMPS is the Ai’s probability of success in the above game.
Definition 4
For any adversaryAi, ifAdvAiIBMPS is negligible, the IBMPS scheme is secure against chosen message attacks and chosen
identity/warrant attacks.
5. IBMPS SCHEME CONSTRUCTION
We construct a novel IBMPS scheme based on the Wang’s identity-based signature scheme [15]. As we defined in Section
4, our scheme consists of seven algorithms: Setup, Extra, Sign, Verify,MPGen,MPSign, and MPVerify.
5.1. Setup
By taking the parameter k, the algorithm Setup is run by PKG.
1) PKG randomly chooses two primes p and q where p satisfies p  2 (mod 3) and q satisfies q  4 (mod 9) or
q  7 (mod 9). After that, PKG computes the module N = p  q.
2) Following the Lemma 1, PKG sets ; ;  which satisfy  = [q   1 (mod 9)]=3,  =  (mod 2) + 1, and
 = (q   1)=3.
3) PKG also chooses a non-cubic residue a such that

a
q

=  1 and sets  = a (mod q).
4) PKG picks up five hash functions H1; H2; H3; H4, and H5, in which H1;H4 : f0; 1g ! ZN , H2; H3; H5 :
f0; 1g ! f0; 1g`.
PKG obtains master secret keysmsk = (p; q; ) and public parameter pp = (N;H1;H2;H3;H4;H5; a; ; ).
5.2. Extra
For each users, by taking an identity ID, PKG extracts the secret key dID .
1) PKG computes ! = H1(ID) (mod q).
2) PKG sets a flag c =
8><>:
0; if ! = 1
1; if ! = 
2; if ! = 2
and sets a general functionH(ID) = ac H1(ID) (mod N). Note that
H(ID) 2 CRN .
3) PKG generates the secret key by
dID = H(ID)
2 1(p 1)(q 1) 3
9 (mod N); (1)
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PKG distributes dID along a flag c in a secure way. Everyone in the system can compute such a value H(ID) according
to public ID and c.
5.3. Sign
The original signer O generates the signature on the datam.
1) O randomly chooses an integer r 2 ZN and computes its cube by R  r3 (mod N).
2) O sets the hash value h2 = H2(mjjR) and then computes the signature by V  r  dh2O (mod N).
The signature is  = (R; V ).
5.4. Verify
Anyone could check the signature  on datam by phasing  to (R; V ) and checking Equation (2)
V 3 H(IDO)h2 ?= R; (2)
where h2 = H2(mjjR).
5.5. MPGen
To authorize the proxy signers P1;P2; :::;Pn, the original signer O makes the delegation warrant !, which specifies
necessary delegation details, including the delegation types, the legal range of the proxy servers, and the expiry time of
delegation, etc. Pi generates a new signing key of proxy signers in an interactive way as follows.
5.5.1. Delegation generation.
The original signer O first confirms the delegation warrant ! by signing on it.
1) O randomly chooses an integer ro 2 ZN and computes its cube Ro = r3o .
2) O sets the hash value h2 = H2(!jjRo) and computes Vo = ro  dh2o .
3) O further broadcasts the delegation (!;Ro; Vo) to the designated proxy signers P1;P2; :::;Pn.
5.5.2. Delegation verification.
Once receiving delegation requests, each proxy signer Pi first confirms ! and checks Equation (3)
V 3o H(IDo)h2 ?= Ro; (3)
where h2 = H2(!jjRo). Proxy signers accept the delegation if Equation (3) is satisfied. Otherwise, it aborts.
5.5.3. Proxy key generation.
Once accepting the delegations, each proxy signer Pi generates its new signing key by
skpi = Vo  dh3pi ; (4)
where h3 = H3(!jjRo). We suggest using H3 instead of H2 for security requirement. skpi is used to partially sign the
data on behalf of O.
5.6. MPSign
Each proxy signer Pi signs the datam under ! cooperatively on behalf of O.
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1) Pi randomly chooses an integer ri 2 ZN and computes its cube Ri = r3i (mod N). Pi computes ti = H4(Ri)
and broadcasts ti to other cloud servers Pj .
2) Once receiving tj , Pi broadcasts Ri to other proxy signers.
3) Once receiving Rj , Pi checks tj ?= H4(Rj). If one of equations dissatisfies, aborts. Otherwise, Pi computes
U =
Qn
i=1Ri (mod N) and sets the hash h5 = H5(!jjmjjU) and computes vi = ri  skh5pi (mod N) and
broadcasts vi to other proxy signers.
4) Once receiving vj from other proxy signers, Pi first checks each Equation (i=1,2,...,n)
v3i H(IDpi)h3h5 ?= Ri  V h5o ; (5)
where h3 = H3(!jjRo) and h5 = H5(!jjmjjU). If one of the equations dissatisfies, it aborts. Otherwise, Pi
computes V =
Qn
i=1 vi (mod N).
Once all partial signatures are correct, the IBMPS on datam can be aggregated as p = (!;Ro; Vo; U; V )
5.7. MPVerify
Once receiving the data m and the IBMPS p = (!;Ro; Vo; U; V ), any verifier operates the following verification
algorithm.
1) The verifier checks whetherm conforms to !.
2) The verifier checks whether P1;P2; :::;Pn are authorized by O according to the warrant !.
3) The verifier accepts IBMPS if and only each of Equation (6) holds:
V 3 H(IDo)h2h5 
nY
i=1
H(IDpi)
h3h5 ?= U  V h5o (6)
where h3 = H3(!jjRo) and h5 = H5(!jjmjjU).
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS
6.1. Correctness
The IBMPS scheme is correct since
V 
nY
i=1
vi 
nY
i=1
ri  skh5pi 
nY
i=1
ri  (Vo  dh3pi )h5

nY
i=1
ri  (ro  dh2o )h5  dh3h5pi 
nY
i=1
ri  rh5o  dh2h5o  dh3h5pi (mod N); (7)
we have
V 3 
nY
i=1
Ri  V h5o  (d3o)h2h5  (d3pi)h3h5  U  V h5o  (d3o)h2h5 
nY
i=1
(d3pi)
h3h5
 U  V h5o  (H(IDo) 1)h2h5 
nY
i=1
(H(IDpi)
 1)h3h5 (mod N): (8)
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Finally, we have finished it since
V 3 H(IDo)h2h5 
nY
i=1
H(IDpi)
h3h5  R  V h5o (mod N): (9)
6.2. Security Proof
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem)
If the integer factoring problem is (t0; 0)-hard, our IBMPS scheme is (t; qE ; qS ; qH ; n; )-secure against existential forgery
on the adaptively chosen message attack and chosen identity/warrant attack which is satisfying
0  4
9
 2
2(qH + 1)
  (2n+ 6)qSqH
2N

(10)
t0  2t+O(k2`+ k3) (11)
where k and ` are security parameters.
Proof
It is assumed that there is an attackerA which has the ability to break our IBMPS scheme, we could construct an algorithm
C as a simulator which plays with the adversary A and solves the integer factorization problem at the end of the game.
Given an instance N for two unknown primes p and q product, our final target is that the simulator C could output p or
q at the end of the simulation.
The simulator C and adversary A take part in the following games. C sends the public parameter pp =
fN;H1; H2; H3; H4; H5; a; ; g to A. C maintains several lists (listh1 , listh2 , listh3 , listh4 , listh5 , listS , listW ,
listM , listMPS) which are empty in the beginning. C responses A’s requests as follows.
 H1-query. To response to A’s query, C maintains a list listh1 with the tuples (ID; c; h1; s). Once a query on ID,
C first checks listh1 and returns h1 if the ID already exists in listh1 . Otherwise, C randomly picks up two integers
s 2 ZN and c 2 f0; 1; 2g, respectively, and sets h1 = H(ID) = s3=ac (mod N) C, returns h1 as an answer toA
and adds the entry (ID; c; h1; s) to listh1 .
 Extra-query. C queries ID in listh1 and actively performs a H1-query on ID if ID is not yet defined. C returns
s as a secret key to A.
 H2-query. C sets up listh2 with the tuples (m;R; h2). Once A requests hash function H2 on (m;R), C returns
h2 directly if the tuple (m;R) is in listh2 . Otherwise, C randomly chooses h2 2 f0; 1g` and adds (m;R; h2) into
listh2 and returns h2 to A.
 H4-query. C establishes a list listh4 with the tuples (R; h4). Once a query on the randomness R, C returns h4 if
the R in the list. Otherwise, C randomly chooses h4 and adds (R; h4) into listh4 and returns h4 to A.
 H5-query. C maintains a list listh5 with the tuples (!;m;R; h5). OnceA requests hash functionH5 on (!;m;R),
C directly returns h5 if the tuple (!;m;R) is in the list listh5 . Otherwise, C randomly chooses h5 2 f0; 1g` and
adds (!;m;R; h5) into listh5 and returns h5 to A.
 Sign-query. Once A queries a signature by ID onm, C first computes H(ID) = ac  h1 since C controls listh1 ,
and randomly picks two integers V 2 ZN and h2 2 f0; 1g`. If the tuple (m;V 3 H(ID)h2) is not in the listh2 , C
sets R = V 3 H(ID)h2) and returns (R; V ) as the signature to A. C then adds (ID;m;R; V ) to listS , and adds
(m;R; h2) to listh2 . In short, C can control the signature oracle and play withA to answer any signature even if C
does not obtain the secret key.
 Delegation-query.
– When A1 requests one of the honest proxy signers, we denote proxy singer with identity IDn.A1 chooses a
warrant ! and generates the signature  = (Ro; V o) for !. ThenA1 sends (!; ) to C. Verifying the validity
of , C adds ! to listW .
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– If A2 requests to interact with the original signer, A chooses a warrant !, and asks original signer to sign on
!. In this case, due to the lack of the secret key, C queries to the standard signing oracle O(do; ) for help.
Once getting a result  from O, C sends (!; ) to A2 and adds ! to listW .
 MPSign-query.A asks a multi-proxy signature on (p;m), in which the user ID1 is in the proxy group. C returns
in the following ways.
1. When ! does not exist in the listW , C must halt at once. Otherwise, C gets o = (Ro; Vo) through the
standard signature oracle.
2. C recoversH1(IDi) from the listh1 .
3. p = (m;!;R0; R; V ) is a valid proxy signature onm by IDi (i = 1; 2; :::; n) on behalf of ID0 under !.
4. C adds the tuple (!;m) to listM , and sends p to A.
Eventually, A either fails or returns a forgery.
We apply the Forking Lemma [19] by replaying the oracle technique. Since C controls all the oracles, C resetsA twice.
In the first time, C records all the transcripts with A. In the second time, C returns all the same value from the transcripts
exceptH2 oracle. C returns two random integers t1, t2 as the answer, respectively.
1. A forges a signature (R; V ) onm and ID, where (ID;m; R; V ) =2 listS , and
(V )3 H(ID)h2  R (mod N):
According to the Forking Lemma,A could forge two signatures (R; V ) and (R; V ) onm and ID and sends
to C. C looks up listh2 to obtains t1 and t2.
If t1   t2 6 0 (mod 3), C could get (V )3St1  R (mod N) and (V )3St2  R (mod N), where S =
ac H(ID) = s3 for unknown s. C can get
(V =V )3  St2 t1 (mod N):
It can be divided into two cases:
 If t2   t1  1 (mod 3), for some integer k, we have t2   t1 = 3k + 1. Therefore, S  ( V V Sk )3, that is
s = V

V Sk .
 If t2   t1   1 (mod 3), for some integer k, we have t2   t1 = 3k   1. Therefore, S  (V SkV  )3, that is
s = V
Sk
V  .
Therefore, C can get a cubic root s of S. Furthermore, if C gets two different cubic root of S, C can factor N
Through Algorithm 1.
2. When A1 forges a signature (!; R; V o ; V ) onm, where user IDO is the original signer, ! =2 listW , and
V 3 H(IDO)h2h5 
nY
i=1
H(IDpi)
h3h5 ?= R  V h5o
where h3 = H3(!jjRo) and h5 = H5(!jjmjjR).
3. When A2 forges a signature (!; R; V o ; V ) onm, where (!;m) =2 listmps, and
V 3 H(IDo)h2h5 
nY
i=1
H(IDpi)
h3h5 ?= R  V h5o
where h3 = H3(!jjRo) and h5 = H5(!jjmjjR).
Thus, we have finished the proof.
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7. MEDAP-I: THE APPLICATION OF IBMPS SCHEME
7.1. Multi-Entities Delegated Authentication Protocol in Cloud
We build a multi-entities delegated authentication protocol MEDAP-I in [20] using our novel IBMPS scheme. MEDAP-
I is made up of five steps: System initialization, Authentication tag, Authentication delegation, Multi-authentication,
Verification.
7.1.1. System initialization
This step sets up the system parameters and distributes every entity’s secret key. SA runs Setup algorithm by taking the
parameter k and obtainsmsk = (p; q; ) and pp = (N;H1; H2; H3; H4; H5; a; ; ). For every participant with identity
ID, SA runs Extra algorithm and generates the corresponding secret key dID for the entity.
7.1.2. Authentication tags
 Tag generation. The mobile data owner O computes an authentication tag for the data m by using Sign
algorithm. O randomly chooses an integer r where r 2 ZN and then computes its cube R = r3 (mod N). O sets
h2 = H2(mjjR) and computes V  r  dh2O (mod N). The authentication tag is tag = (R; V ) which is along
with the datam and uploaded to the cloud servers.
 Tag verification. Once receiving the datam and its corresponding authentication tag tag, the cloud servers verify
tag by using the Verify algorithm and check V 3 H(IDO)h2 ?= R where h2 = H2(mjjR). The cloud confirms
m if tag is a valid one. Otherwise, it aborts.
7.1.3. Authentication delegation
To authorize the authentication rights to mobile cloud, O makes the valid delegated warrant ! in three steps.
 Delegation generation.O firstly confirms ! and signs on it.O randomly chooses an integer ro 2 ZN , computes its
cubeRo = r3o , sets h2 = H2(!jjRo) and computes Vo = ro  dh2O .O broadcasts  = (!;Ro; Vo) to the designated
cloud servers P1;P2; :::;Pn.
 Delegation verification. Once receiving the requests from O, every Pi firstly confirms  = (!;Ro; Vo) by
checking V 3o H(IDO)h2 ?= Ro where h2 = H2(!jjRo). Pi accepts  if valid. Otherwise, Pi requests a new
delegation from O, or aborts.
 Proxy key generation. Once accepting the requests, Pi generates a new proxy singer key by skpi = Vo  dh3pi ,
where h3 = H3(!jjRo).
7.1.4. Multi-authentication tag
Cloud servers P1;P2; :::;Pn cooperate to sign on the data m under the warrant ! on behalf of the mobile data owner
O in an interactive way.
 Each Pi chooses a random integer ri 2 ZN and computes its cube Ri = r3i and ti = H4(Ri) and broadcasts ti.
 Once receiving tj (j 6= i), Pi broadcasts Ri to other servers.
 Once receiving Rj (j 6= i), Pi checks each tj ?= H4(Rj). If one of the equations dissatisfies, it aborts the
protocol. Pi aggregates R Qni=1Ri (mod N), sets h5 = H5(!jjmjjR), computes vi  ri  skh5pi (mod N),
and broadcasts vi.
 Once receiving vj (j 6= i), Pi checks each equation v3j H(IDPj )h3h5 ?= Rj  V h5o , where h3 = H3(!jjRo)
and h5 = H5(!jjmjjR). If one of the equations dissatisfies, the protocol aborts immediately. Pi aggregates
V Qni=1 vi (mod N).
Once all the designated cloud servers have finish the above algorithm correctly, the multi-authentication tag p of the data
m can be generated by all the cloud servers as p = (!;Ro; Vo; R; V )
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7.1.5. Authentication verification
Once receiving m and the multi-authentication tag p = (!;Ro; Vo; R; V ), the data consumer does the following
operations.
 The data consumers checks that P1;P2; :::;Pn are legally authorized by O according to !.
 The data consumers accepts p if and only if V 3 H(IDO)h2h5 Qni=1H(IDPi)h3h5 ?= R  V h5o where h3 =
H3(!jjRo) and h5 = H5(!jjmjjR).
Finally, the data consumer is convinced to accept the data which are authenticated by the mobile data owner O. The
MEDAP-I finishes.
8. MEDAP-II: EXTENSION PROTOCOLS
In some scenarios, a certain scope of the mobile data owners are sharing one copy of data that all of these data owners are
responsible for. In this case, all of these data owners need to sign on the data and further aggregate to one signature, which
is named as multi-signature. When it comes to the authentication delegation, all of these mobile data owners interactive
to negotiate a common delegation credential to the cloud servers which play the role of proxy signers. In this section, we
extend single data owner in our MEDAP-I in Section 7 to multiple data owners, shown in Figure 2. We design a novel
protocol built on a cryptogrphic primitive, an identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature (IBMPMS). According to our
IBMPS scheme, we can continue to construct IBMPMS scheme through a transforming one original signer to multiple
original signers. In addition, when the cloud servers are considered into one entity, through the same employment, we also
design a protocolMEDAP-III built on Wang’s work an identity-based proxy multi-signature (IBPMS) [16] to adapt to the
different demands in the mobile cloud computing.
Cloud Servers
 (Multi-proxy Signers)
Authenticated dataAuthentication delegation Data 
Consumer
Data 
Consumer
Data 
Consumer
Mobile Data Owner 
(Original Signer)
Mobile Data Owner 
(Original Signer)
Mobile Data Owner 
(Original Signer)
System Authority
Figure 2. A multi-data owners multi-servers delegated authentication in mobile cloud computing
Since the system initialization and the secret key distribution steps are almost the same as protocols, we only focus on
the illustration that the multiple data owners delegate their signing right to multiple cloud servers, which serve the data
consumes authentication service.
8.1. Authentication delegation
To delegate the multiple signing capabilities to the various cloud servers, the data owners, as original signers do the
following steps to generate a valid warrant !, which could specify the delegation details.
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8.1.1. Delegation generation.
The data owners interactive to confirm the warrant ! by signing it like a multi-signature way.
1) Each data owner Oi chooses an integer ri 2 ZN and calculates its cube Ri = r3i (mod N).
2) Each data owner Oi sets ti = H4(Ri) and then broadcasts ti to other data owners.
3) Once receiving ti, each Oi broadcasts Ri to other data owners.
4) Once receiving Ri, each Oi checks each ti ?= H4(Ri). If one of the equations dissatisfies, it aborts. Otherwise, Oi
aggregates R Qni=1Ri (mod N), sets h2 = H2(!jjR), computes vi  ri  dh2Oi (mod N), and broadcasts vi
to other data owners.
5) Once receiving vi from other data owners, Oi checks each Equation (12)
v3i H(IDOi)h2 ?= Ri; (12)
where h2 = H2(!jjR). If one of the equations dissatisfies, the protocol aborts. After that, Oi aggregates V =Qn
i=1 vi.
8.1.2. Delegation verification.
Each Pi confirms  = (!;R; V ) by checking Equation (13)
V 3 
nY
i=1
H(IDi)
h2 ?= R; (13)
where h2 = H2(!jjR). Since
V 3 
nY
i=1
H(IDOi)
h2 
nY
i=1
v3i H(IDOi)h2 
nY
i=1
(ri  dh2i )3 H(IDOi)h2

nY
i=1
r3i 
nY
i=1
(d3i H(IDOi))h2  R (mod N); (14)
Pi accepts the delegation only if  is a valid one.
8.1.3. Proxy key generation.
Once confirming the delegations, each Pi generates a proxy key by Equation (15)
skpi = V  dh3Pi ; (15)
where h3 = H3(!jjR). Pi keeps it on behalf of the data owners when demanded.
8.2. Multi-server authentication generation
Each Pi signs on the datam under the warrant ! on behalf of a group of the data owners Os as follows.
1) Pi chooses an integer ~ri 2 ZN and calculates its cube ~Ri = ~r3i and ~ti = H4( ~Ri), and then broadcasts ~ti.
2) Once receiving ~ti, each Pi broadcasts ~Ri.
3) Once receiving ~Ri, each Pi checks each ~ti ?= H4( ~Ri). If one of the equations dissatisfies, the protocol
aborts. Pi aggregates ~R Qni=1 ~Ri (mod N), sets h5 = H5(!jjmjj ~R), calculates ui  ~ri  skh5pi (mod N),
and broadcasts ui.
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4) Once receiving ui, Pi checks each Equation (16)
u3i H(IDPi)h3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOj )
h2h5 ?= ~Ri Rh5 ; (16)
where h2 = H2(!jjR) , h3 = H3(!jjR) and h5 = H5(!jjmjj ~R). If one of the equations dissatisfies, the protocol
aborts. Pi aggregates U =Qni=1 ui.
When all of the partial signature are correctly checked, the multi-server authentication tag is made up by p = (!;U;R; ~R)
8.3. Authentication verification
Once receivingm and p = (!;U;R; ~R), the data consumer makes the following operations.
1) The data consumer checks whetherm conforms to !.
2) The data consumer checks whether P1;P2; :::;Pn are authorized by O1;O2; :::;On under !.
3) The data consumer accepts p if and only if Equation (17) holds:
U3 
nY
i=1
H(IDPi)
h3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5 ?= ~R Rh5 (mod N) (17)
where h2 = H2(!jjR), h3 = H3(!jjR), and h5 = H5(!jjmjjR).
8.4. Correctness
TheMEDAP-II is correct since
U3 
nY
i=1
H(IDPi)
h3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5 
nY
i=1
(u3i H(IDPi)h3h5) 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5

nY
i=1
((~r3i  sk3h5Pi ) H(IDPi)
h3h5) 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5 
nY
i=1
~r3i  (V  dh3Pi)
3h5 H(IDPi)h3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5

nY
i=1
~Ri  V 3h5  (d3Pi H(IDPi))h3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5  ~R  V 3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5
 ~R 
nY
j=1
v3h5j 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5  ~R 
nY
j=1
(rj  dh2Oi)
3h5 
nY
j=1
H(IDOi)
h2h5
 ~R 
nY
j=1
r3h5j  (d3Oi H(IDOi))h2h5  ~R 
nY
j=1
Rh5j  ~R Rh5 (mod N): (18)
where we use d3ID H(ID)  1 (mod N) in Section 5.
8.5. Performance Comparison
We compare MEDAP-I and MEDAP-II with related work, which are secure under different assumptions such as
computational Diffie-Hellmen assumptions. We use the operation data from [21] that an operation time for one bilinear
pairing operation (denoted as P ), map-to-point hash operation (denoted as H), modular-exponentiation (denoted as E),
normal scale multiplication (denoted asM ), pairing based scalar multiplication (denoted as Psm) in Table I.
From Table II,MEDAP-I andMEDAP-II are efficient since it does not introduce heavy operations such as the bilinear
pairing compared to [22, 18, 23] and are suitable for the cloud environment since the cloud takes the most computation
and the data consumers are in a low cost. For simplicity, we denote the symbol () in Table II that we assume that the
participant number is at least 3.
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Table I. Cryptographic operation time (ms) in [19].
Operation Pair E H M Psm
Running time 20.01 11.20 3.04 0.83 6.38
Table II. Comparison of computation cost and running time when n = 3.
Schemes MPGen Time MPSign Time MPVerify Time Assumption
LC05 [22] 3P+6Psm 103.71 3P+1E+3Psm 84.57 4P+1E+3Psm 78.19 CDH
CC09 [18] 3P+2H+3Psm 85.34 P+3H+1E+2Psm 127.39 4P+2H+3Psm 99:0 CDH
SP15 [23] 2P+5Psm 71.98 P+5Psm 71.98 2P+4Psm 65.6 CDH
MEDAP-I 3E+7M 39.41 3E+(2n+5)M 42.73* 3E+(n+4)M 39.41* Factorization
MEDAP-II 3E+(3n+7)M 46.88* 3E+(3n+5)M 45.22* 3E+(2n+3)M 41.07* Factorization
9. RELATED WORK
The cryptographic primitive of proxy signature was introduced by Mambo [24] in which the original signer designates the
signing right to an authorized proxy signer and the latter can make a valid signature on behalf of the former. One of the
variant of the proxy signature is multi-proxy signature scheme which is proposed by Hwang that an original signer can
authorize a group of proxy agent to make a signature. Another type is the proxy multi-signature presented by Yi [25] in
2000, which allows that the only one proxy agent can make a signature on behalf of a group of original signers. Currently,
most of the proxy signature schemes have been proposed based on bilinear pairing technique [22, 18, 23], however, it
brings a heavy overhead to implement bilinear pairing in mobile devices. As a result, the researches have moved to focus
on the simpler assumptions and easier implement techniques.
To simplify key management, Cocks [26] presented a provable secure identity-based encryption under quadratic residue
assumption without using bilinear pairing in 2001. Bellare [27] proposed the first IBMS scheme proven secure under on
RSA assumption with three round interactions. After that, Bagherzandi [28] proposed a two round IBMS also proven
secure under RSA assumption by using a commitment scheme. Chai [29] further proposed an identity-based signature
scheme based on quadratic residues. Wei [11] proposed two secure IBMS schemes under quadratic residue assumptions
using the technique in [27] and [28]. Moreover, Xing [17] proposed an identity-based signature scheme proven secure
cubic residues. Wang [15] proposed an improved provably secure identity-based signature based on cubic residues, which
is quite efficient compare to [17]. Yu [30] also presented a secure proxy signature scheme from factorization. Wang [16]
presented an IBMPS scheme proven secure under cubic residues.
10. CONCLUSION
In this work, an IBMPS scheme has been built under cubic residue assumption, which is as hard as integer factorization
problem. We have also proved that our IBMPS scheme is secure against adaptively chosen message attacks and chosen
identity/warrant attacks by using random oracle. Aiming to different situations and preventing single point of failure
in a mobile cloud computing model, we have proposed three secure multi-entities delegated authentication protocols
(MEDAPs), which enable them to conditionally authorize their authentication rights to designated cloud servers without
directly exposing their secret keys. After such an authorization, the cloud servers can achieve the data authentication
services when the mobile data owners are offline. Furthermore, MEDAPs are efficient compared with other pairing based
protocols and the communication overhead is nearly constant which does not depends on the number of cloud servers.
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In our future work, we leave three open problems. Firstly, it needs three rounds of interaction in the algorithmMPSign,
which costs communication overhead. It is a suggestion to reduce one round by building a commitment scheme under cubic
residue assumption like RSA-based commitment [28] and quadratic residues based commitment [11]. Secondly, it might
be a solution to propose constructions under higher residues such as 2k-th residues [31]. Thirdly, the protocol is suggested
to reliability and robustness that the cloud system allows authentication service ongoing even if a large proportion of the
authorized cloud servers are broken down or compromised.
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